When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

Muhayyile yetisi ve fonksiyonları bilgiyi elde etme süreçleri bağlamında üzerinde durulması gereken önemli hususlardan biridir. Tarihi seyir içerisinde, bu bağlamda yapılan tartışmalara önemli katkılarda bulunan isimlerden biri klasik dönemin seçkin simalarından İbn-i Sînâ iken, diğeri ise modern dönemin zirve ismi Kant’tır. Bu iki düşünürün muhayyile teorilerine dair bir karşılaştırma, bir taraftan konunun daha iyi anlaşılmasına yardımcı olacakken diğer taraftan da İbn-i Sînâ ve Kant’ın konu bağlamındaki görüşlerinin ne ölçüde benzerlik ve farklılıklar içerdiğini belirlememize yardımcı olacaktır. Bu çerçevede çalışmanın temel tezi, (...) Kant’ın muhayyile teorisinin mahiyeti ve ele aldığı problemler açısından, İbn-i Sînâcı yaklaşımdan önemli ölçüde farklı olduğudur. Bu en temelde, Kant’ın muhayyile yetisinin sentez fonksiyonunu, deneyimi mümkün kılan a priori bir akt olarak bilincin birliğiyle ilişkisi içerisinde ele almasına karşın, İbn-i Sînâ’nın bu yetinin fonksiyonlarını soyutlama sürecini açıklama bağlamında incelemesinden kaynaklanır. Buna bağlı olarak Kant, muhayyile yetisinin fonksiyonlarını bilinç düzeyinde ve kapsamlı bir akt olarak ele alır. (shrink)

Prior to his renewed incumbency, as the fourth Prime Minister ofMalaysia, Mahathir Mohamad was able to remain in power for amore prolonged period compared to his predecessors. He was actively involvedin galvanizing political action immediately after the independence of Malaysiaand did not abandon active politics until his 2003 resignation. Under Mahathir’sleadership and guidance, Malaysia made remarkable economic and politicalprogress. He oversaw many innovations in the fledgling democracy and wasable to develop the country due to his exceptional leadership qualities. His styleand (...) attitude towards engaging with problems, particularly his stance during theAsian Monetary Crisis in 1997, was highly criticized by some, and labelled asdictatorial. This stigma did not detract him from the path he considered rightfor Malaysia, and under his leadership he garnered worldwide appreciation forhis national efforts and success in overcoming the economic crisis. Mahathiris undeniably an excellent case study as a prime minister, as well as a highly productive person. He contributed to a better understanding of modernMalaysia and his own tenure as PM in a series of books and articles. One ofthe significant aspects of his political heritage is his influential charisma andleadership. In all of his undertakings he has attracted both passionate supportand hatred from friends and foes, but his political footsteps have always beencertain and directed toward Malaysia’s national wellbeing. Mahathir is apolitician with sharp views on many issues and he was profoundly brave inverbalising them in the public arena, within Malaysia and internationally. Hisclear posture and speeches without fear made him a world-embracing politicalpersonality. This descriptive research study adopts a qualitative approach toanalyse historical information, documents, memoirs and articles, and books tobetter understand the leadership of Mahathir. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

Epidemics are situations that ruin the functioning of the social due to their characteristics concerning the disruption of the usual pace of daily life and reshaping of human actions and social encounters. In terms of its impact, the Covid-19 global epidemic has brought about changes in a series of daily life practices, from business and working life to public encounters, from education and health services to human relations, public encounters and the organization of the society on a time-space scale, based (...) on repetition. Everyday life is directly related to the establishment of the society depending on the repeatability of day-to-day activities as a routine of social relations and public encounters on a certain time-space scale. This study discusses how the society, which became possible as a result of the repetitive structuring of human actions with the Covid-19 epidemic, has transformed through new routines, new habits, new time-space practices and new public encounters. (shrink)

Cet article examine le paysage européen sous l’angle des droits sexuels, portant l’attention sur l’unité fictive de l’Europe et les contradictions qui émergent entre les différents pays concernant les femmes en particulier. Le Lobby européen des femmes, les législations sur l’avortement, les processus de renaturalisation de la condition féminine avec des arguments écologiques, les déchirements autour de la prostitution, mettent en scène des dissonances importantes.

Le mot de « phallocratie » des années 1970 est remplacé par celui de « patriarcat » dans le mouvement des femmes des années 2010. Ce changement s’accompagne d’une dépolitisation du mouvement, aujourd’hui soucieux, avant tout, d’obtenir des actions gouvernementales efficaces, et ouvert à toutes les opinions politiques. Il s’ensuit une forte demande de moralisation des comportements comme en témoigne le travail de l’unité de « dépatriarcalisation » du ministère du tourisme en Bolivie.

In democratic countries such as Turkey, political parties are established around charismatic leaders and these leaders stay at the centre of the party, from naming the party to the arrangement of deputy candidates. National Outlook, a movement which prevailed in Turkish politics for forty years, won its biggest victory and formed a coalition government in 1995 with the True Path Party, under the leadership of Tansu Ciller. Having secularized its legal system in the early years of the Republic, successive regimes (...) in Turkey aggressively westernized all aspects of life. However, during the multiparty period, the style of radical secularism in Turkey was opposed by conservative groups and it has been criticized since then. The relationship between civil society and the military has always been problematic in Turkey, as the Turkish Army has always been suspicious of conservative governments on the issue of secularism. On several occasions the military has intervened in politics in order to prevent Islam from impinging on the Republic’s secular identity, and it expected to continue in its role as the champion of secularism when the Justice and Development Party came to power in November 2002. For the Turkish military, the National Outlook Movement is more dangerous than Kurdish separatist terrorism, being labelled irtica. The paper provides insights into the Turkish political context for the decision and analyses the roles of key actors in Turkish politics, such as Government and Army, during the 28 February 1997 process, their motivations and the policy processes in the country. (shrink)

The evaluative categories (goodness, badness, betterness, and the like) and the deontic categories (requiredness, permittedness, forbiddenness, and the like) are separate families of normative categories, each with its own distinctive logic, structure, and basis. The aim of this chapter is to argue that there is a third family of normative categories beyond these familiar two, with its own special logic, structure, and basis, namely the fitting. This family includes properties and relations picked out by terms such as ‘fitting’, ‘apt’, ‘merited’, (...) ‘warranted’, and ‘justified’, as well as certain adjectives ending in ‘-able’ (e.g. ‘admirable’), ‘-ing’ (e.g. ‘annoying’), ‘-ive’ (e.g. ‘persuasive’), ‘-some’ (e.g. ‘fearsome’), and ‘-worthy’ (e.g. ‘blameworthy’). Acknowledging the distinctiveness of fittingness as a type of normative category changes how we think about the foundations of ethics and other normative disciplines. Instead of asking, “Is the good prior to the right, or the right prior to the good?” we should be asking, “What are the priority relations among the right, the good, and the fitting?”. (shrink)

The permissible and the forbidden are privative opposites: each is a lack of the other. The good and the bad are, by contrast, polar opposites: badness is anti-goodness, not non-goodness. What about the fitting and the unfitting, the appropriate and the inappropriate, the apt and the inapt, the warranted and the unwarranted? Is unfittingness non-fittingness or anti-fittingness, inappropriateness non-appropriateness or anti-appropriateness? This essay argues that each of these “aptic” categories stands in a privative rather than a polar relation to its (...) opposite. More generally, there is no coherent notion of anti-fittingness, no inversely charged flipside to aptness, to be found. In order to establish these claims, a taxonomy of different types of oppositeness is proposed, and several tests for distinguishing distinct varieties of opposites are developed. What emerges is a better appreciation of the structural characteristics of fittingness and the other aptic categories, as well as an argument for taking up the nature of oppositeness as a serious philosophical topic that is ripe for further exploration. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

This study focuses on the concept of people developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in the context of radical theories of democracy and populism. People is defined as a subjectivity established as a contingency in the conflictual environment of politics. The construction of the people is a condition of the existence of populist politics as a form of subject that enables the division of politics and social into two camps in the form of friend/enemy and the formation of antagonisms. (...) The article seeks to answer the question of how to create a political order in Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the people in a pluralistic society, in order to cleanse politics from antagonistic (struggle between enemies) relations and transform it into agonistic (struggle between adversaries) relations, despite the danger of eliminating each other through a friend-enemy relationship. In this study, it will be discussed whether the antagonism that constitutes the foundation of politics and society is indestructible and whether it is a subject figure in which the people is organized as a counter-hegemonic subject against certain kinds of antagonisms and whether those who are partners can come together agonistically. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

We introduce crossed modules in cycloids, as a generalization of cycloids, which are algebraic logical structures arising in the context of the quantum Yang–Baxter equation. As a spacial case, we in particular focus on the crossed modules of $L-$algebras. These types of crossed modules are exceptional, since the category of $L-$algebras is not protomodular, nor Barr-exact, but it nevertheless has natural semidirect products that have not been described in category theoretic terms. We identify crossed ideals of crossed module in $L-$algebras, (...) and obtain some characteristics of these objects that are normally not encountered on crossed modules of groups or algebras. As a consequence, we characterize crossed self-similarity completely in terms of properties of $L-$algebras and the boundary map forming the crossed module. (shrink)